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s a scholar of media and politics, I am frequently
asked to participate in media commentary during
election years. Although I wholeheartedly believe
in the importance of academic outreach to the larger
world, I suspect that this is my least favorite part of
my job. It is in this context that I am most often
told–strongly, unequivocally, and unanimously–
that I am wrong. The multitude of observations involving media and politics about which I am wrong
is both wide and deep. They converge around my
relative naiveté in understanding the sheer power
of the monster. When I take part in a radio call-in
program or appear on an election-night television
broadcast, then I, too, become part of the monster,
wielding its incredible power while simultaneously
denying its very existence.
While both the public and academics agree that
media have influence in elections, the scales on
which these two entities believe media matter suggest an enormous chasm. Public perceptions of the
power of media in elections, and the academic evidence of its influence, could not be further apart.
This essay conveys an understanding of the origins
and consequences of this great divide with respect
to assessments of campaign media, including both
political programming and political advertising.
© 2012 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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First, I provide a sketch of how academic
thinking on this topic has evolved since
the early twentieth century. Second, I
explain in greater detail the origins of
public beliefs in omnipotent media. I also
respond to the counterarguments that are
frequently offered up to prove that academics are simply too out of touch with
the real world to understand what is actually going on. Finally, I explore the reasons
that this gap in understanding has only
widened in recent years.
For American citizens, it often seems
self-evident that, as the old adage goes,
political candidates are sold like soap:
they are simply advertised directly to the
public.1 In reality, there are fewer similarities than one might expect between the
selling of packaged goods and the winning
of votes for candidates. Because of these
dissimilarities, public assessments of the
importance of paid and unpaid media in
campaigns may be off by miles rather than
inches. Candidates are much more dif½cult to sell than soap, particularly when
they run for high-level of½ces that attract
the most press attention and the strongest
claims for media influence. The purpose
of this essay is to outline the reasons for
this great divide, and then to highlight
the seriousness of its consequences for
the allocation of political resources.

W

hen academics talk about the effects
of mass media on elections, the received
history is often described in terms of three
distinct periods in scholarly thought about
the importance of media in altering mass
opinion. This evolution characterizes
scholars as initially believing that media
had massive effects on political attitudes
and opinions, followed by a period in
which these effects were assumed to be
minimal, and ending with a third era in
which such effects were once again assumed to be at least substantial, if somewhat different in nature.
84

This received view is nothing more than
a conveniently reconstructed straw man,
with little connection to the weight of
scholarly research on media effects at any
given point in time.2 In the early part of
the twentieth century, to the extent that
scholars studied political persuasion at all,
they used a case study approach. Between
the two world wars, covert propaganda
was of particular concern, and many academic case studies were used as part of a
large-scale public education effort known
as the Institute for Propaganda Analysis.
The Institute prepared and distributed instructional materials to schools and adult
education groups in order to educate the
mass public about how to recognize covert
propaganda. The Institute’s reformist mission was to protect the public from potential influence, and the best way to do that,
its founders believed, was to heighten
public awareness of the threat.3
Historians suggest that one would be
hard pressed to ½nd evidence of a scholar
from this interwar period claiming actual
evidence of the massive effects of propaganda.4 However, implicit in the scholars’
meticulous attention to analyzing media
messages, and in their desire to protect
the public, was the assumption that media
at least had the potential for great influence,
and thus the public was at risk. Their goal
was “to alert the public to the dangers of
manipulation.” Many academics from
this period “shared an impulse to protect
. . . against the new alliance of institutional
persuaders and modern communication
practitioners.”5 In essence, social scientists engaged in “a kind of clinical social
science” in which the public in its entirety
was their at-risk patient. Clearly, scholars
were worried, but they did not go so far as
to claim or document an actual impact
from propaganda or from mass media
more generally.
From the 1940s onward, researchers
have empirically evaluated media influ-

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

ence on political opinions and on vote
choice in particular. Sociologist Paul
Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia University initiated this work, using a
series of panel surveys of single communities in the United States. These studies,
later known collectively as the Columbia
Studies,6 suggested that most citizens
knew for whom they would vote long
before the general election campaign; and
in interview after interview, they stuck to
that preference. In the original Erie
County, Ohio, study of the 1940 election,
only 8 percent ever changed their minds
between May and the November election.
Those few who did change their preference had exceedingly low levels of exposure to political media, thus making it
dif½cult to argue that they were persuaded
by campaign communications.7 On this
basis, the minimal-effects conclusion was
launched.
Starting in the 1950s and continuing to
the present, a nationwide data collection
effort known as the American National
Election Studies (anes) took over the
task of understanding how people decide
for whom to vote. However, by the time
the anes was organized and under way,
the notion that media had only minimal
effects on vote choice was already ½rmly
entrenched in academe. As a result, the
anes directed little effort toward studying media effects, and even if it had done
so, the results would most likely have been
disappointing. The central pattern originally observed in the Columbia Studies
persists today: those most likely to change
their vote choice are the least likely to be
heavily exposed to political media. Upon
reflection, this pattern is not all that surprising; those most heavily interested and
involved in politics in this country are also
heavily partisan, highly committed to
their choices, and thus unlikely to be dissuaded, regardless of any media to which
they are exposed. Heavy exposure to
141 (4) Fall 2012

media simply does not go hand in hand Diana C.
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with a propensity to change opinions.
In fact, now as then, an overwhelming
majority of voters decide for whom they
will vote many months in advance of an
election. Many know that they will vote
for the Democratic or Republican candidate even before the parties have of½cially chosen their nominees. As a result, the
number of people who are available as
possible targets of persuasion is relatively small. In 2008, for example, between
70 and 80 percent of partisans knew their
vote choice well before the general election campaign of½cially began, thus making it dif½cult to argue that they were persuaded by any campaign communications. Notably, this proportion is even
greater than what Lazarsfeld and his colleagues found in the 1940s. As media
scholars point out, presidential elections
can be decided by very small margins, so
Lazarsfeld’s 8 percent who changed preference–or the more recent, substantially
lower estimates from 2008–can still be
highly consequential.8 But then as now,
few of the changers are exposed to a great
deal of political media.
In what is typically characterized as a
third era of scholarly study, the consensus
has drifted back toward an equilibrium in
which most researchers claim evidence of
neither massive nor minimal media effects,
particularly when speaking to the issue of
whether media directly persuade people
to support one candidate over another in
the context of an election. Although occasional studies demonstrate statistically
signi½cant persuasion effects,9 efforts to
study entirely different kinds of media
influence are now most common. These
media effects include learning from media
exposure, agenda setting, and priming. As
a result of this greater diversity in study
outcomes, scholars today often do not de½ne effect in the same way that scholars of
these earlier eras did. In particular, the
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realm of effects of interest has shifted
away from media’s direct persuasive influence on public opinion to more subtle
and indirect means of altering political
processes.
For example, media’s ability to prime
certain issues over others has indirect
implications for vote choice. To the extent that campaign media emphasize an
issue that is perceived as one candidate’s
strength or another’s weakness, the voter’s
decision-making calculus will be skewed
more heavily toward evaluating candidates on that particular issue, which
could favor one candidate over another.
Few people are single-issue voters, but
issue priming could to some extent shift a
candidate’s overall favorability. Nonetheless, this process is subtle and indirect
relative to more obvious, direct efforts to
persuade.
Not everyone has shied away from
direct persuasive effects, however. One
prominent exception to these generally
lower expectations is the perspective advanced by political scientist John Zaller,
who argues that media effects are indeed
massive on an ongoing basis; we are simply unable to observe them in most observational (that is, non-laboratory) contexts. In short, Zaller denies the absence
of evidence as evidence of absence.
Instead, he suggests that the gross influence of competitive media in the political
environment is huge, but that because the
two-candidate and party organizations
generally cancel one another out through
their persuasive efforts, the net impact of
media on opinion is often slim to none.
As long as the amount of media is balanced and both sides promote their messages to roughly the same extent and with
the same degree of skill, the net influence
will appear to be zero even though it results from large amounts of persuasion on
both sides. According to this theory, if one
side chose, for example, not to advertise,

the opponent would experience a landslide victory. But under ordinary circumstances, competing communication flows
from each side maintain the status quo.10
This clever idea makes a great deal of
sense in many political contexts. It also
highlights the need to study situations
with large imbalances of media on one
side versus the other in order to observe
media impact in the real world. Some of
Zaller’s work has been able to do just
that, primarily in the context of downballot races–for example, elections for
the House of Representatives in which
one candidate’s communication budget
swamps the other candidate’s budget. But
such scenarios are still dif½cult to interpret in unambiguous causal terms. After
all, the reason one candidate has so much
more money to spend on advertising
than the other is typically because he or
she is more popular to begin with. Moreover, down-ballot races are precisely the
kind in which advertising works most
easily. In these cases, persuasion is not
necessarily required to change an individual’s vote; name recognition alone
may be enough.11
While Zaller’s argument is compelling,
it is nonetheless surprising that evidence
of media persuasion in politics remains so
slim. As a recent review noted, “Volumes
of research on electoral communication in
recent years have produced precious little
evidence of large effects.”12 Although the
recognition of new types of effects has
meant that scholars now claim at least
“not so minimal” influence, current ½ndings are not all that different from the
conclusions drawn in the 1970s minimaleffects classic, The Unseeing Eye: The Myth
of Television Power in National Politics:
Symbolic manipulation through televised
political advertising simply does not work.
Perhaps the overuse of symbols and stereotypes in product advertising has built up an
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immunity in the television audience. Perhaps the symbols and postures used in
political advertising are such patently
ridiculous attempts at manipulation that
they appear more ridiculous than reliable.
Whatever the precise reasons, television
viewers effectively protect themselves from
manipulation by staged imagery.13

Others have argued that the lack of evidence in academic research is due to problems in the reliability of media-exposure
measures in observational studies. Selfreported survey measures of exposure are
indeed suspicious for a number of reasons14; however, their true-score reliabilities are no worse than the kinds of outcome measures they are used to predict.15
Thus, it is dif½cult to explain why a noisy
independent variable is problematic, but a
noisy dependent variable is not. Survey
research using similarly unreliable measures indeed produces evidence of effects
such as political learning. For these reasons, the methodological argument falls
short of explaining this pervasive pattern.
Yet another possibility is that usual sample sizes do not have suf½cient statistical
power to detect effects.16
Whether the problem in documenting
media influence during campaigns is
largely methodological or instead comes
from the fact that actual effects are typically much smaller and more infrequent
than anticipated when they occur at all,
the end result is the same. The small to
null effects that can be “teased out of massive electoral communication campaigns”
are not terribly impressive.17 Although
advertising is just one form of election
media, conclusions about the impact of
the news are similarly underwhelming,
unless one looks for effects other than a
change in vote preference, or if one looks
at low-pro½le, local races. The scholarly
consensus, speci½cally on direct persuasive
effects of media on vote choice–the type of
effect that most fascinates the public and
141 (4) Fall 2012

the media–is still that media’s impact is Diana C.
marginal at most. Advertising appears Mutz
most influential in races for low-level
of½ces where name recognition alone can
produce votes. The slick, highly professional advertising that most Americans
think of as powerful appears in high-level
races such as the presidency–and there
is little evidence of direct persuasive
effects in these races. Moreover, advertising effects appear to be short lived when
they do occur. Although laboratory studies can easily demonstrate what works
and what does not, these results are widely believed to be ungeneralizable to the
rough-and-tumble world of real politics.

I

n contrast to the waxing and waning
(and rewaxing) of the academic consensus
regarding media’s influence on opinions,
the American public has consistently believed in very powerful media effects on
vote choice and public opinion for a long
time. Is this yet another case of poor communication between the academic world
and the public? To some extent; but this
gap stems more directly from the public’s
use of different forms of evidence for inferring media power.
For most Americans, evidence of media’s political power is obvious and omnipresent. After all, they watch television,
read newspapers (both online and in
print), and see the ads, whether on the air
or as a topic of discussion in other media.
Thus, foremost among the heuristics that
signify media’s power is ubiquity. Media
are literally everywhere in Americans’
physical environments. They follow people into their cars, accompany them while
on vacation, and permeate day-to-day life.
Size matters; in the eyes of citizens, things
that are large or widespread are usually
also perceived to be important. Indeed, the
more publications by a particular author
that graduate students are required to read,
the taller they will estimate that scholar
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to be, and the more facial hair they will
expect him to have.18
Media’s ubiquity leads people to infer
that media must be powerful, if only because its presence dominates all aspects
of life and reaches all kinds of people.
Although political media flood the airwaves only during election years, Americans think about the sheer number of people reached by these political messages
and assume high levels of persuasion from
the high visibility of media. Further, many
of these messages are obviously designed
to be persuasive, so it seems self-evident
that they must move opinions.
Americans believe in the political power of television in particular. The 1987
U.S. News & World Report cover heralded
“Television’s Blinding Power.” This “telemythology,” as it has since been dubbed
by academics, consists of “a set of widely
circulated stories about the dangerous
powers of television.”19 There is a strong
belief among Washington elites “that the
general public can be mesmerized by television images. . . . The power of television is perhaps more ½rmly an article of
faith in Washington than anywhere else
in the country.”20
In addition to the tremendous reach and
visibility of television, most Americans
are well aware of the mass persuasion
industry and of political consultants and
political advertising in particular. Given
the received wisdom that politicians are
sold just like soap, why shouldn’t the public infer that political ads, like product advertisements, typically persuade people
to “purchase” the product? This simple
analogy often fails because the political
context includes several important differences. First, although there is brand loyalty when one buys soap, it is nothing like
the long-term brand loyalty inspired by
political parties, which tends to remain
stable throughout adulthood. Given that
most Americans vote consistent with

their preexisting party identi½cation,
these persuasive communications are up
against fairly powerful adversaries.
Moreover, the product marketplace includes dozens of choices for soap. For this
reason, one brand rarely campaigns against
another by throwing mud at a speci½c
target. If Dove badmouths Irish Spring,
consumers can easily turn to Dial instead
of Dove, so negativity is not an ef½cient
approach to boosting sales. Further, as
noted above, it is easier to observe effects
from product advertising because Dial
and Dove seldom launch their advertising
campaigns at exactly the same time. When
one brand is promoted, but not the other,
it is far easier to observe the effectiveness
of an advertising campaign in influencing
purchases. In the political world, this kind
of timing seldom happens; election day is
the same for both candidates, so the candidates run their campaign communications
more or less simultaneously.
If ubiquity and the analogy to product
advertising are not enough to convince
Americans of the power of mass media,
then surely the prevalence of political consultants will do so. As my nonacademic
friends typically argue, “No candidate in
his or her right mind would spend that
kind of money on something if it didn’t
work!” This is an excellent and extremely
interesting point. If media are not a powerful force for mass persuasion, why do
political candidates spend the bulk of
their campaign budgets on media? Indeed, nothing is more visible about the
campaign than media consultants:
The airwaves teem with political commercials. The newspapers overflow with commentary about the broadcast spots. And
then new tv spots incorporate the print
commentary about the old spots. At times
candidates and voters seem to be on the
sidelines, passively observing the media
consultants and ad agencies on the playing
½eld.21
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Citizens logically infer that all this activity
must somehow make a difference.
To push this argument further, why
wouldn’t political media consultants
eventually go out of business if they were
ineffective at producing the results their
candidates desire? The rise of highly professionalized political campaigns is known
worldwide as the “Americanization” of
campaigns: “The usa is universally acknowledged as the leader in campaign innovation, historically the ½rst to embrace
the paraphernalia of political marketing.”22 Campaigns in many other countries have now followed suit because professionalized American campaigns are
believed to be more effective.
Professionalized campaigns emerged
in the United States not because they
demonstrated superior abilities relative
to former methods of campaigning but
because of the decline in patronage labor
to run campaigns. As the patronage system waned in the United States, fewer
people volunteered to work for campaigns; thus, commercial ½rms with paid
employees stepped in to ½ll the void.23
Around the same time, the development
of computerized voter databases and specialized communications technology encouraged the formation of ½rms that
offer expertise on everything from producing television advertisements, to sending direct mail, to the use of commercial
telephone banks.
Does this specialized expertise give a
competitive advantage to those who hire
campaign consultants? Possibly, but this
is far from a foregone conclusion. The
limitations of informal observation as a
means of assessing effectiveness are severe
in the context of elections. As one consultant has noted, the dominant assumption
is that “everything you did in a winning
campaign was a good idea and everything
that you did in a losing campaign was a
bad idea.”24 Given that winning or losing
141 (4) Fall 2012

is a very crude outcome measure, learn- Diana C.
ing via this kind of evidence takes place Mutz
only very slowly, if at all. This problem is
further complicated by the fact that election outcomes are consistently overdetermined. There are so many factors to which
one might attribute a victory (or loss)
that one is never certain. Was it the ad
campaign? The negative ads in particular? The press’s discussion of the negative
ads? The debate performance? A lack of
success in getting out the vote on election
day? The economy? The weather?25
With as many possible claims as there
are components to a campaign, campaign
professionals tend to rely on tradition
and intuition rather than data. As one
seasoned campaign manager noted: “It’s
probably the only industry in the world
where there’s no market research. . . . But
a billion dollars is spent on politics every
cycle. No company, no entity, no business
would spend that amount of money
without knowing what works. . . . No one
who gets hired wants to admit they don’t
know anything.”26
Indeed, campaign operatives seldom do
their own research on what works most
ef½ciently, and they have systematic disincentives to consider independent academic research on these topics if it suggests substantially changing what they do:
Consultants make money by selling specialized expertise (e.g. crafting ads, conducting
polls, buying airtime). The pro½tability of
their ½rms is greatly enhanced by selling
the same type of service to a variety of different campaigns. Thus, for example, a given consultant who specializes in running
campaigns that rely on direct mail and
phone banks has an incentive to manage
several campaigns that each rely on these
technologies.27

Campaign consultants are heavily invested in certain approaches. They make
money by transporting these capacities
89

Campaign
Media in
the
American
Mind

90

from place to place and election to election. If what they do is not as effective as
has been assumed, they may not want to
know about it because that would wreak
havoc on their business models: “Few
involved in management of campaigns
have an interest in developing a clear
sense of what works.”28
In a few isolated cases, consultants
have collaborated with academics to run
scienti½c ½eld experiments in order to
test, for example, which techniques have
the greatest effect in increasing turnout.29
But for the most part, consultants are uninterested in empirically validated best
practices and prefer to stick with folk
wisdom. Tracking polls, which show overtime trends in a candidate’s standings,
are about as close as they come to gathering evidence that allows them to ascertain whether one approach works better
than another. But in an uncontrolled campaign environment in which everyone receives the “treatment,” there are typically
so many potential interpretations of what
caused any observed change that strong
causal inference is impossible.
Often, the knowledge gained can only
bene½t those campaigns that follow the
one invested in the research. As one campaign operative complained, “Finding out
the day after the election that Treatment
A was the best is of limited value to an
organization like ours. We’re actually trying to win the election.”30 Moreover, if
you are a campaign consultant, trying
something new can easily lead to blame
for a loss, whereas sticking with what
everyone else does carries less risk. Given
that there are no independent ½rms systematically monitoring the effectiveness
of campaign strategies, sticking with
what is assumed to matter most is the
safest strategy.31
If campaign professionals generally do
not execute these kinds of studies, then
why not academics? Do political scien-

tists or market researchers have useful
things to say about campaign tactics?
Neither the National Science Foundation
nor any other foundations fund research
on “what works” to gain votes for one
candidate over another; this would be
considered partisan spending. The closest academics come to this kind of focus
is research on turnout. Because turnout is
considered a public, nonpartisan good,
research on this topic is widely funded in
academe. Certainly, knowledge about
how to increase turnout can be used for
partisan purposes when areas favorable
toward a given candidate are targeted for
increased turnout while others are not.
But studies of political persuasion in the
context of campaigns are seldom the
focus of academic research because of
their partisan implications. As a former
editor of Campaigns and Elections suggests,
“Practitioners think that political scientists are not studying problems of interest and are therefore not helpful.”32
To summarize, a combination of factors
collude to make elusive any well-controlled empirical research on how media
can most ef½ciently influence public opinion. First, the accumulation of knowledge
is hindered by the fact that campaign
consultants are reluctant to participate in
the research that would be necessary to
½nd out how to use media most ef½ciently. They fear that purposely not exposing
parts of the population to their media
will lose votes. When one campaign did
sign on for an experimental ½eld study,
the move “potentially set one campaign
manager up for malpractice.”33 No one
wants to undermine the chance for victory. The fact that only subsequent campaigns might bene½t from the research
provides another disincentive. Finally,
campaign consultants’ business models
rest on certain assumptions that, if untrue, could prove ½nancially disastrous
for them.
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Ironically, America leads the world in
spending huge amounts of money on
something that only possibly accomplishes what it sets out to do. If campaign
media does persuade voters, it does so
highly inef½ciently. In reality, “The claim
of political savants and insiders that the
right commercials and the right consultants can win any election . . . is fed by the
self-serving myth that certain ‘magic
moments’ on television have turned elections around.”34
But perhaps more important, because
observers of campaigns perceive highly
professionalized campaigns to be more
likely to succeed, candidates continue to
pay huge amounts to campaign professionals, who continue to rely on instinct
and tradition in spending candidates’
money. There is a self-ful½lling aspect to
the professionalization of campaigns. If a
candidate does not spend large sums on
television (the least ef½cient of campaign
communications), then he or she is seen
as less “serious” as a candidate. This impression can impair fundraising ability
and the candidate’s perceived electability,
even if the ads themselves affect no one.
The visibility and professionalism of
campaign media heavily influence perceptions of its potential impact:
In an environment where very little is
known about what kinds of campaign tactics actually work, those who purchase
these campaign services must rely on their
intuitive sense of what makes for an effective campaign. There is a natural tendency
to gravitate toward tactics that command
the attention of others, particularly potential donors. Campaigns crave attention and
credibility: expensive, large-scale, professionally crafted communication is a way to
demonstrate one’s seriousness of purpose.35

Thus, while the general public associates greater professionalism with greater
impact, research ½ndings often suggest
141 (4) Fall 2012

otherwise. Expensive television adver- Diana C.
tisements attract a great deal of attention, Mutz
but they may be one of the least costeffective means of persuading voters.
A psychological tendency known as the
persuasive press inference, or third person effect,
further exacerbates the public tendency
to perceive large media effects. More
educated and involved partisans are especially likely to perceive that others are
influenced by media, though certainly not
themselves. Their assessments of the extent of influence from any given message
systematically exaggerate the amount of
influence. As a result, “The power of the
media resides in the perception of experts
and decision makers that the general
public is influenced by the mass media,
not in the direct influence of the mass
media on the general public. That is to say,
the media’s political appeal lies less in its
ability to bend minds than in its ability to
convince elites that the popular mind can
be bent.”36

Today, the great divide between public

and academic perceptions of media influence on vote choice may be widening still
further. The more overtly partisan political media environment has led many academics to assume that the potential for
changing preferences through political
news has waned a great deal. As news and
talk shows become more plentiful and increasingly partisan, citizens can more easily self-select like-minded programming
that is unlikely to change their preferences
as much as reinforce them. To what extent
these theories of waning influence will be
borne out has yet to be observed, but
many scholars have speculated that individuals’ exposure to ideas they do not
already agree with will be increasingly
limited, thus making persuasion unlikely
as well. Thus, academics have already
begun to note “the waning of mass media
influence in the lives of most citizens.”37
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The mass public, on the other hand,
looks at some of the programming on
offer today and ½nds it to be heavily biased
toward one candidate or the other–more
so than in the past. As a result, the public
sees the potential for persuasive influence
from media as greater than ever before.
Without taking into account the likely
audiences for these programs, the content
itself seems far more hard-hitting and
potentially persuasive than the news programs of the past, which at least attempted to achieve balance and neutrality.
Further, through a bizarre trend dubbed
media narcissism, self-reflexive reporting, or
metacoverage, media have become fascinated with themselves as a political force,
and they increasingly cover their own
importance in the political process as a
standard part of election coverage.38
According to many journalists, the campaign story has become the analysis of
candidates’ use of media to manipulate
the public into voting for them. In 1980,
one reporter claimed, “Never before, it
seemed, had so many reporters, correspondents, editors, executives, candidates, consultants, and just plain citizens been so
conscious of the power of the press.”39
It is doubtful that this phenomenon
emerged full blown in 1980; after all, popular assumptions about the importance
of media in winning elections were also
high in the 1940s. According to popular
legend, Roosevelt’s victories were attributable to his “superb radio voice,” which
enabled him to exploit the medium better
than Landon or Willkie.40 And books such
as author Joe McGinniss’s The Selling of
the President offered entertaining anecdotal
tales of media power to popular audiences
in the 1960s. But according to scholars,
media metacoverage has increased. Thus,
in 1988, Michael Dukakis’s loss was attributed to his failure to “package” himself
successfully for the demands of media
politics, and George H.W. Bush’s success

was attributed to his superior media consultants.41 The amount of time the media
spend talking to and about themselves
has increased relative to the time they
spend talking about actual politics. In
short, the media have shifted their focus
increasingly to themselves.42
Metacoverage is obviously self-serving
to a degree, in that media are continuously
celebrating their own importance in the
political process. But my view is that this
practice stems from more than a sense of
self-importance. Rather, political media
see themselves as a modern-day Institute
for Propaganda Analysis, focusing on
strategy and tactics in an effort to prevent
the unwitting public from becoming victims of political persuasion. By covering
potentially persuasive media, they make
us “cognoscenti of our own bamboozlement”43; they make us feel as if we are
smarter than others who may fall prey to
these tactics.44 The same protective impulse that drove early assessments of propaganda’s potential still influences journalists’ perceptions of their audiences’
susceptibility. Moreover, expressing cynicism about persuasive appeals makes the
individual cynic feel smarter, and media
coverage of politics encourages us to be
among those “in the know.” Although the
press’s intentions may be good, this portrayal of campaigns and elections is not a
flattering portrait of the public or of the
political process. The public is viewed as
gullible and easily manipulated by all
things nonpolitical, and the process itself
is portrayed as a sham.
The extremely high levels of spending
on American political campaigns are a
perennial cause for disdain of the American electoral process. For the 2012 presidential election, the Supreme Court’s 2010
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
decision has become the whipping boy,
but other previous decisions, such as
Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, have produced
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similar outcries about the increasingly
high costs of elections. The underlying
reason that people are upset about the
amount spent on campaigns is that they
believe money buys television airtime,
which, in turn, buys votes. When television time does buy votes, it does so highly
inef½ciently. Thus, my own complaint is
somewhat different: the problem with the
high costs of campaigns is that such huge
amounts of money are spent unproductively and inef½ciently when they could
be spent in ways that more directly affect
Americans. Despite the rise of narrowcasting, television is still among the least
ef½cient means of persuasion, dollar for
dollar. But the high costs of television and
its perceived necessity mean that political leaders feel they must spend more and
more of their time raising money rather
than governing.

For a variety of reasons, media influence

is indeed a dif½cult topic to study outside
the laboratory. But regardless of the
extent to which media actually influence
election outcomes, we are not, as a political culture, well served by these extreme
beliefs in media power. My problem with
this common approach to covering campaigns runs deeper than the usual gripe,
which is that coverage of strategy and tactics displaces more serious coverage of the
campaign. The real problem stems from
our culture’s underlying attitude toward
political persuasion more generally.
I was struck by this underlying assumption when the human subjects committee
at one of my former universities decided
that political persuasion was a form of
harm to human subjects. Even though the
experiment involved nothing more than
exposing subjects to highly substantive
political arguments on different sides of
an issue, this approach was deemed potentially harmful to research participants
because their political views might be
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changed in all manner of directions. The Diana C.
Institutional Review Board wanted the Mutz
study participants to be persuaded back
to their former opinions at the conclusion
of the study. This struck me as absurd. If
persuasion equals harm, then our political system has some pretty serious problems on its hands. The entire purpose of
election campaigns is to provide politicians with opportunities to expose the
public to their persuasive arguments.
Persuasion, rather than coercion or violence, was thought by our Founders to be
a preferable means of conducting politics. But today we are ambivalent, at best,
about this core part of our political system.
Presidential candidates spend around
70 percent of their extremely large campaign budgets producing and airing political ads.45 Even in the relatively lowpro½le midterm elections in 2010, candidates spent around $1.5 billion. Outside
groups, such as Super pacs, now add substantially to total campaign spending.
Professionalization of campaigns sends a
signal to citizens that these people know
what they are doing; they have expertise
that we do not, so we are the potential victims of their efforts to manipulate us. But
if the emperor has no clothes, then what?
The real tragedy here is not that so much
is being spent or that people are being
persuaded to change their minds willynilly, but rather that so much is being
spent without effect. If campaigns effectively inspire, galvanize, and mobilize the
American public, it is easier to defend
their massive expenditures on media. But
if they do so only through a highly inef½cient waste of time and resources, then
this reality is indeed regrettable.
Does it matter that the mass public
believes in large media effects instead of
smaller, more realistic ones? Beyond
sheer waste and inef½ciency, the tremendous emphasis of journalists on media
power in elections, and the corresponding
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strong belief in its influence among the
mass public, have negative consequences
for the perceived legitimacy of our system
of government. It has long been argued
that political participation in the form of
voting in elections is an especially inef½cient way to express one’s political views.
The chance that one’s vote will matter is
in½nitesimal, and even if one is lucky
enough to have supported the candidate
who ultimately wins, our political system
is suf½ciently complex that there is no
guarantee that the elected of½cial will be
able to accomplish his or her speci½ed
goals. What makes elections legitimate in
the eyes of the mass public is not that the
electorate always gets its way. Instead, the
process itself is what confers legitimacy on
the outcome. But if the process is believed
to be a function of who hired the better
political consultants or who spent more
on advertising, then it becomes very dif½cult for those on the losing side to see the
election outcome as legitimate.
If elections are believed to be won and
lost because of the tactics of professional
campaign consultants–not because of the
beliefs of the mass public, or the merits of
candidates, or politics–then how can the
outcome be respected? As one observer

put it, “What better excuse than that the
game was rigged, the press bought, the
television networks intimidated . . . and
voters led like lambs to the polling
booths.”46 Today, there are strong differences of opinion among Americans about
the appropriate role of government in
society and about how that government
should be run. These are real differences,
not made-for-tv conflicts. Sadly, the
“mythology of the great power of U.S.
election campaign practices” does little
to advance public understanding of or
respect for these very real differences.47
Finally, in addition to wasted resources
and less perceived legitimacy in election
outcomes, beliefs in the power of campaign media ultimately elevate media’s
actual power in elections. It is a cliché to
say that politics is about perceptions, but
it is also true. As long as 90 percent of the
American public believes that the news
media influence who becomes president48 and more than 70 percent see that
influence as growing,49 candidates and
their campaigns will continue to behave
as if these perceptions were true. To do
anything else risks being seen as less serious and, therefore, less electable.
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